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This paper focuses on the question of how income inequal-
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1 Introduction
Income disparities among regions, such as those between the North and
the South of Italy and Spain, create conicts in the provision of public
goods due to the trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency. Often, these
tensions are mitigated either by reducing the size of the public sector
as a whole or by decentralizing scal powers from the centre to local
governments as examples from the United Kingdom, Canada and United
States illustrate. In some cases, states choose to split up, as with, for
example, the former Czechoslovakia.
Strong income inequalities among European countries will probably
constrain future European public policies, especially following the recent
enlargement.
Typically, governments introduce some redistributive mechanisms in
the nancing of public goods in order to reach equity targets. Tanzi
(2000) argued that "one of the major functions of a national government
is precisely to redistribute income from richer regions and individuals to
poorer regions and individuals through the broadly uniform provision of
public goods and services". However, the cost of greater equity is a loss
of e¢ ciency.
Income inequality may also lead to several forms of segregations be-
tween rich and poor, as argued by Bjorvatn and Cappellen (2003a) and
Horstmann and Scharf (1999).
This paper studies the e¤ects of regional income inequalities on a gov-
ernments policy choices. In a context where policy is negotiated by
regional representatives and not decided unilaterally by a paternalist
central planner, we will show that greater income disparities among re-
gions lead to greater ine¢ ciencies in the provision of public goods. A
divergent income trend between rich and poor makes interregional redis-
tributive conicts more dramatic and may lead to an under-provision of
public goods. Consequently, the larger the income disparity, the lower
the size of the public sector. As a result, a wealthier economy may lead to
a relatively smaller public sector when income disparity increases. This
paradoxical conclusion is particularly evident in the case of homogeneous
preferences in which the only income disparity counts.
Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003b) use cross-national regressions to show
that more inequality, measured by Ginis coe¢ cient, is associated with
smaller government size. This paper gives a theoretical explanation of
this phenomenon that is di¤erent from both Kristow, Lindert and Mc-
Clelland (1992) and Tridimas and Winer (2004). In Kristow, Lindert
and McClelland (1992), the size of the public sector depends on the po-
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sition of the median of the medians. In particular, they argue that the
closer the median voter to the riches, the less the redistribution, which
implies a smaller government size in a model with a uniform propor-
tional income tax. In our model, the medians of a richer and a poorer
jurisdiction bargain in the central legislature over the size of the public
sector, whose nancing implies a certain amount of redistribution. The
agreement is not coercive, which means that the poor cannot compel
the rich to increase their tax income transfers without mutual consent
and vice versa. It is, therefore, easier to reach a political agreement on
a larger public sector in states with both more homogeneous preferences
and distribution of income.
Tridimas and Winer (2004) suggest that an explanation of the smaller
public sector in countries with more unequal income distribution could
be a distribution of political inuence in favour of the rich. In our
cooperative bargaining model, political inuence is equally distributed
between rich and poor. However, the rich use the veto to constrain
government spending when they have the perception that it exploits
their private benets. Similarly, there are also circumstances in which
the veto is used by the poor to avoid exploitations against them.
As Aysan (2005) pointed out, income inequality increases the pressure
for redistributions and, at the same time, the incentives to constrain
them. In our model, which of the two conicting interests prevails does
not depend on the aggregate di¤erence between benets and losses, as a
benevolent central planner would consider. It depends on the net gains
of the rich and poor regions separately. When one region has negative
net gains, then its representative exercises the veto and the agreement
is not reached. The size of the public sector is smaller because a larger
income inequality increases the incentive for the rich to exercise the veto.
Furthermore, policies which appear e¢ cient from an aggregate point of
view because total gains are positive, fail to be implemented because
they are not Pareto e¢ cient for every region.
Our bargaining approach can also be considered as an alternative to the
most common utilitarianism approach. The latter focuses on issues that
involve no conict between di¤erent jurisdictions, as well as individuals,
groups and classes (Sen, 1973). Sen argues that the utilitarian approach
by maximizing the sum of individual utilities is supremely unconcerned
with the interpersonal distribution of that sum1.In this paper we show
Sens argument when we compare the central planners with the bar-
gaining outcome.
1Sen, 1973, p. 16.
3
Jaramillo, Kempf and Moizeau (2001) explain the social segmentation
produced by income inequality. They apply the theory of clubs in which
members voluntarily contribute to the funding of the club good. As Max
Weber theorized almost one century ago, fragmentation or social clo-
sureis a result of the attempt of the richer to exclude the less fortunate
from the benets of a common good. A way to create fragmentation
in a society characterized by economic inequality among regions is the
decentralization of taxing and spending powers from the central towards
local and regional governments, as observed by Horstmann and Scharf
(1999) and others.
Fausto (2003) stresses the consequences caused by the disparities
between wealthy and poorer regions in Italy. He argues that the fun-
damental means used to make a surreptitious division of the country is
the nancing of regions on the basis of local tax revenues and of local
revenues of national taxes. Inevitably, this leads to rich regions having
greater nancing and higher provision of public services thanks to their
greater revenues. Furthermore, undermining redistributive ows among
regions contributes to increased regional conicts creating an atmosphere
contrary to national cohesion.
Our model can be seen as extending Besley and Coates (2003) political
economy analysis. They focus on the issue of which level of government
should be responsible for particular taxing and spending decisions. We
develop the workings of the central government focusing on the decision
making process. In a model with two regions and two representatives,
Besley and Coate approach decision making in the central government
considering two scenarios: the non-cooperative and the cooperative leg-
islature. In the rst, power is randomly allocated to one of the regional
delegates, who have a probability of 0.5 to choose policy by maximizing
their own welfare. To some extent, we consider this case as the solution
to the non-benevolent dictator. In the cooperative case, the legislature
is assumed to maximize delegatesjoint surplus. We refer to this case as
the social optimum or the rst best policy outcome.
Amain di¤erence between this paper and Besley and Coates model is
that we explicitly explain how regional representatives bargain over pol-
icy. Another di¤erence is that government does not split the cost equally
between regions, but it covers the provision of public goods through a
proportional income tax. Furthermore, we stress the importance of in-
come disparity on public policy decision-making. We highlight inter-
regional redistributive conicts, which cause a greater ine¢ ciency in the
size of the public sector the larger the income gap between regions.
Lockwood (2002), Cerniglia (2003) and Lucas (2002) presented three
4
di¤erent models of bargaining in the central legislature in a scal fed-
eralism context. Lockwood (2002) also focuses on Oates (1972) and
Besleys and Coates (2003) issue regarding the choice between centrali-
sation and decentralisation of scal policy in a political economy setting.
In Lockwood, it is interesting the working of the centralized legislature.
He assumes that a central government forms policy in a legislature com-
prising of elected representatives from each region. Unlike our model,
decisions on a local and discrete public goods are taken by majority vote.
Precisely, delegates rst propose their alternative projects. Then, all al-
ternatives are voted on according to an amendment agenda. Following
Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey (1987), Lockwood assumes that "the
last vote pits the bill as amended against the status quo".
Cerniglia (2003) integrates the distributive politics literature with the
political economy literature of countries, unions or federations. She
models a legislative bargaining model by specifying the behaviour of a
central legislature composed of an odd number of representatives elected
by regions and whose preferences di¤er over local public goods. As in
Lockwood (2002), representatives make a decision by majority vote on
how to allocate the amount of local public goods nanced by a linear
income tax or by a regional income tax. With respect to our model,
Cerniglia considers a more extreme threat point represented by seces-
sion. She investigated whether the credible threat of secession by any
region modies the agenda-setter proposal and hence the outcome of the
legislative bargaining game. The result is that the bargaining outcome
depends on both the particular representative randomly chosen to be
the agenda setter and the particular voting structure of the game.
Lucas (2002) gives a theoretical approach to transfers sharing by nego-
tiation between central government and regions. He presents a model
in which the central government, which takes action as a Stackelberg
leader, rst chooses the way to negotiate the transfers with regions (bi-
laterally or multilaterally). In the second stage, the bargaining process
takes place and the federal government implements transfers to the re-
gions. In this framework, Lucas analyses how spillovers a¤ects the choice
of the bargaining process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
analyses both the dictator solution and the social optimum. Section
3 presents the legislature equilibrium policy and sections 4, 5 and 6
the results. Section 7 concludes and Section 8 discusses some future
developments.
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2 The framework
2.1 The set-up
Consider two groups of people living, for example, in two separate re-
gions or jurisdictions comprising a state. Each region elects its own
representative, who is identied on the median voter. The regional rep-
resentatives form the legislature which has to determine the size of the
public sector.
The two median voters, i and j, have di¤erent income levels and
preferences regarding the public sector. In other words, regions are not
homogeneous. The public and private sectors are denoted respectively
with g and y, with the last representing the median voters income that
is used for private consumption.
We indicate with c private consumption that is equal to the private
income minus the cost of the public sector. The parameter y is the initial
endowment of the median voters, which is partially used to nance the
public sector. The parameter  tells us how much a median voter prefers
g with respect to y. The utility function of each median voter is the sum
of private and public consumption, as follows:
ui = ci + iH (g) with i = 1; 2
where the public sector benet function H (g) is increasing, smooth con-
cave and satises the endpoint Inada condition.
We assume, for simplicity, that the unit cost of the public sector is
one, so that if the size is g the cost of the public sector is just one times g.
Private consumption is equal to private income minus the resources used
to nance the public sector. The legislature nances the public good by
levying a proportional income tax t, such that private consumption is
ci = (1  t) yi for the median voter i = 1; 2. Once the legislature decides
the quantity of g, the tax rate is automatically determined by setting
g = t(yi+yj), which gives the tax rate2 t =
g
yi+yj
. In particular, the cost
paid by median voter i is tyi =
yi
yi+yj
g = ig. Note that median voters
share the cost according to their relative income, denoted with , such
that:
i =
yi
yi + yj
This means that an increase in the income of one median voter also
increases her relative cost while decreasing that of the other median
2The model can be extended in order to consider the case of a not uniform tax
rate as follows: g = tiyi + tjyj . In this case, jurisdictional representatives bargain
over g, ti and tj . However, the median voter theory in this multidimensional case
does not apply. One way to replace the median voters is to introduce representatives
who maximize a function representing the social consensus.
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voter; that is: @i=@yi > 0 and @i=@yj < 0. The cost of the public
sector is distributed between the median voters as follows g = ig+jg,
implying that i + j = 1.
Private consumption can now be written in the form ci = yi   ig,
which gives the following utility function:
ui = yi   ig + iH (g) with i = 1; 2
The cost sharing mechanism implies an income tax redistribution
from the richest median voter to the poorest one. The provision of the
public sector in the poorest region is partially nanced by the richest re-
gion. We will study how the redistributive implications of a proportional
income tax inuence government policy.
2.1.1 Dictator solution and rst-best
Policy is chosen through bargaining. Before studying the bargaining
outcome of this model, we will rst describe briey two benchmark cases:
the dictator solution and the social optimum.
First, we will determine how a non-benevolent dictator chooses policy. In
this example, the median voter i possesses absolute executive power and
he is in a position to choose the size of the public sector which maximizes
his private welfare. It is easy to establish the following result: the size
of the public sector gi that the non-benevolent dictator would choose is
the unique solution to the following equation:
i = iH
0  gDi  with i = 1; 2 (1)
Solution 1 is shown in gure 9. It states that the non-benevolent dictator
would choose gi such that his private marginal cost is equal to his private
marginal benet. The private marginal cost i corresponds to the share
of the price the dictator pays for a unitary increment of the public sector.
Instead, iH 0
 
gDi

is the private marginal benet.
The dictator always reduces the public sector size when his private mar-
ginal cost increases; that is: @gDi =@yi < 0, @g
D
i =@yj > 0. The private
marginal cost increases when there is a rise in the dictators relative cost
and income. The e¤ect of changes in the incomes of the dictator i and
the other median voter j leads to the conclusion that the non-benevolent
dictator is a free-rider. He increases the provision of g when the income
of the other median voter increases because this reduces his relative and
marginal cost at the expense of the median voter of the other region. For
the same reason he reduces the provision of g when his private income
increases. Instead, he increases the public good provision when his pref-
erence of the public good increases, while the preferences of the other
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median voter j do not a¤ect the choice of the non-benevolent dictator i;
that is: @gDi =@i > 0, @g
D
i =@j = 0.
Now, we will analyse the e¢ cient policy outcome, which can be inter-
preted as the central planner solution. We suppose that the benev-
olent dictator maximizes an additive social welfare function W (g) =
u1 (g) + u2 (g).
As in Besley and Coate (2003), we assume that the endowments of
the median voters (and of all the taxpayers) are large enough to meet
their tax obligations.
The e¢ cient provision of the public good satises the familiar Samuel-
sonian condition,
(i + j)H
0 (ge) = 1, (2)
which means that the social marginal benet is equal to the social mar-
ginal cost. The social marginal cost is the sum of the private marginal
costs and it is equal to the unitary price, which is one. The social mar-
ginal benet is the sum of the private marginal benets3.
As a direct consequence of the quasi-linear preference function used in
this model, the income level does not inuence the central planners
choice; i.e., dg=dyi = 04, with i = 1; 2. The central planner increases the
size of the public sector when preferences increase; that is: dg=di > 05,
with i = 1; 2.
The optimum provision of the public good is not inuenced by the way
the cost is shared between regions; that is dg=di = 0
6, with i = 1; 2.
From the social planners point of view, the higher cost that the median
voter i bears is compensated by the subsequent reduction of the relative
cost for the median voter j. For the structure of the index , an increase
in the relative cost for one region is always equal to the decrease in the
relative cost for the other one. For this reason, the two e¤ects always
compensate each other and this means that the central planner does not
care how median voters distribute the cost.
We conclude that redistributive conicts are not captured by the cen-
tral planner or utilitarian approach, as pointed out by Sen (1973) and
other authors. In order to highlight the role played by redistributive
conicts on the legislature equilibrium policy we introduce the following
bargaining approach.
3Solution 2 is represented in gure 1.
4The proof is straightforward.
5The proof is straightforward.
6The proof is straightforward.
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3 Legislature equilibrium policy
In this section we will analyze the public policy outcome when decisions
are not taken by a central planner or a non-benevolent dictator, but
directly by the median voters, who we consider to be the elected repre-
sentatives of each region. In this case, representatives form a government
and choose policy by negotiation.
The government has to choose the size of the public sector, g. We assume
that, before the representatives meet in the legislature, the status quo
consists of an ine¢ cient provision of the public sector, g. The status quo
may by ine¢ cient for several reasons because, for example, both median
voterspreferences and income change over time. If any agreement is
achieved, the status quo is maintained.
The utility that each median voter obtains in case of disagreement repre-
sents the median votersinside option in the bargaining process and it is
udi = yi  ig+iH (g); with i = 1; 2. In other words, if an agreement is
not reached, median voters receive a utility from both the ine¢ cient gov-
ernment size, or public consumption, and private consumption7. In order
to reach an agreement, median voters must have positive gains from hav-
ing an e¢ cient government size. Therefore, the agreement utility must
be higher than the inside option for both representatives. In formulas, it
must be ui udi > 0, which implies  i (g   g)+i (H (g) H (g)) > 0;
where i = 1; 2.
We dene the gain from reaching an agreement of median voter i =
1; 2 as the gain from having an e¢ cient government size and we denote
it with the symbol i. In formulas:
i = ui   udi = i (H (g) H (g))  i (g   g)
The gain from reaching an agreement is equal to the net private bene-
t minus the net private cost and represents the private net benet if
agreement is reached on g. It is interesting to note that the marginal
gain from trade is equal to the marginal utility; i.e.:
@i
@g
=  i + iH 0 (g) =Mui: (3)
Representatives choose the government size g by bargaining. We
show that by maximizing the following Nash bargaining condition:
max
g

ln [ i (g   g) + i (H (g) H (g))] + ln
 j (g   g) + j (H (g) H (g))	
7This is presented in gure 2.
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The First Order Condition is:
 ip+ iH 0 (g)
 ip (g   g) + i (H (g) H (g))
+
 jp+ jH 0 (g)
 jp (g   g) + j (H (g) H (g))
= 0
Now, the First Order Condition can be formulated in an alternative
form, which will be very useful in the comparative statics.
Denition 1 Dene with i =
@i=@g
i=g
the elasticity of the gain from
reaching an agreement over an e¢ cient government size of median voter
i = 1; 2.
The elasticity measures the percent change of the gain from reaching
an agreement relative to the percent change of the government size. The
First Order Condition can be now formulated as follows:
Proposition 1 The Nash Bargaining First Order Condition is satised
if and only if the sum of the elasticity of the gains from having an e¢ cient
government size is zero:
i + j = 0 (4)
Proof. The Nash Bargaining First Order Condition can be written
under the following form: 
0
i
i
+
0j
j
= 0. Multiplying it by g we get the
sum of the elasticity of the gains from reaching an agreement.
In other words, at the Nash bargaining equilibrium, the elasticity of
the gains from having an e¢ cient government size of the two median
voters are equal in absolute value and take opposite sign: i =  i.
Equation 4 leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The agreement is a compromise which lies between the two
median votersrst best outcomes, unless they coincide8.
Proof. We need to prove that, at the agreement equilibrium the
marginal utilities of the two representatives take di¤erent sign. To show
that we write equation 4 under the following form:
Mui
i
=  Muj
j
The sign of the elasticity of the gains from reaching an agreement de-
pends only on the sign of the marginal utilities of the representatives
because the denominators are both positive by denition. Equation 4
states that in equilibrium the elasticities of the gains from reaching an
8A representation of the bargaining equilibrium is given in gure 2.
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agreement have di¤erent signs. This is equivalent to say that, at the
agreement point, the marginal utilities of median voters take opposite
signs. This proves the lemma.
In the next section, we use the Nash bargaining First Order Condi-
tion to study the comparative statics.
4 Inuence of income disparity over government
size
Changes in the income of the median voters always generate conicting
interests and the bargaining outcome in the government is not straight-
forward. For example, each median voter would wish to consume more
of the public good when his income grows. However, at the same time,
he has to bear an increasing share of the public good cost. How do the
median voters solve these conicts?
We have already shown that the central planner approach, or the
maximization of an additive social welfare function, is not able to cap-
ture the conicting redistributive interests generated by income inequal-
ity. Instead, conicts are evident when one of the median voter is a
non-benevolent dictator. We have seen that a non benevolent dictator
increases the size of the public sector when the income of the median
voter of the other region increases because this reduces the cost borne by
his regionand increase regional redistributive benets. To generalize,
when a dominant region exists, it has an incentive to free-ride against
the other region.
When regional median voters bargain over the size of the public sector,
associated to a change of their income, they "have a common interest to
co-operate, but have conicting interests over exactly how to co-operate"
Muthoo (1999). The following proposition is the key to solving the
bargaining game between median voters.
Proposition 2 The government increases the size of the public sector
when the income of a median voter increases only if the elasticity of the
gains of the same median voter is su¢ ciently large and greater than a
critical value expressed in the following condition:
dg
dyi
> 0 when i >
 
i   j

(g   g)  (i   j) (H (g) H (g))
(i + j) (H (g) H (g)) 
 
i + j

(g   g) .
(5)
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
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Now, it is interesting to study the sign of this comparative static since
both terms of condition 5 can be either positives or negatives9. In order
to do that we need to identify the items on the right hand side. The
denominator represents the total or social gains from having an e¢ cient
government size. The social gains are the sum of median votersnet
gains and can be written as the di¤erence between the social benet and
cost, which we know to be positive by denition. The denominator leads
to the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Larger social gains favour a larger public sector when the
income of one median voter increases.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that larger social gains increase
the denominator of the right-hand side of condition 5.
However, large social gains are often not enough to get a large public
sector. The reasons is that income inequality creates incentives to con-
strain public expenditure. Redistributive conicts are captured by the
numerator of the right hand side of condition 5.
The numerator of condition 5 is the di¤erence between the net benet
and the net redistribution associated with an e¢ cient size of the public
sector. We indicate with NBi = (i   j) (H (g) H (g)) and NTi = 
i   j

(g   g) respectively the net benet and the net redistribution
or transfers of median voter i.
Let us assume that H (g) > H (g), which implies that g > g. Then,
NBi is positive if median voter i values the public sector more than
median voter j. In this case we say that median voter i wants more public
sector than median voter j. Similarly, NTi is positive when median voter
i transfers income to median voter j through the tax system; that is: yi >
yj. In other words, median voter i is partially nancing the provision
of the public sector in jurisdiction j. Conversely, NRi is negative when
median voter i receives a transfer from median voter j.
Both NBi and NRi are zero when median voters have the same
preferences for the public sector and the same income respectively. This
justies the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Both homogeneous preferences and a small income dis-
parity between jurisdictions favour a larger public sector when the income
of one median voter increases.
9Note that  1 < (i j)(g
 g) (i j)(H(g) H(g))
(i+j)(H(g) H(g)) (i+j)(g g)
< 1, as proved in the appen-
dix.
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Proof. The proof is straightforward considering that the numerator of
the right-hand side of condition 5 is zero when i = j and i = j.
Up to now, we have not determined the sign of the comparative static.
Before we do that, we will conveniently simplify the notation by writing
the condition 5 under the following form:
dg
dyi
> 0 when i > (NTi  NBi)'
where ' is the reciprocal of the social net gains and as a positive term
it does not inuence the sign of the comparative static.
Before studying the general case in which median voters have both dif-
ferent income and preferences, we will rst look at the case in which
they have homogeneous preferences.
4.1 The case of homogeneous districts
To simplify the discussion, we will rst consider the case of homogeneous
districts, in which the median voters have the same tastes for the public
good; i.e.: i = j = . Condition 5 becomes:
dg
dyi
> 0 when i >
 
i   j

(g   g)'; (6)
It is now evident how the ine¢ ciency in terms of an under-provision is
produced from the conicts generated by the income di¤erence between
the median voters. The greater the regional income disparity, the greater
the tax income redistribution from the wealthy region in the direction
of the poorer region.
It is easy to verify that the right-hand side of condition 6 is zero when
the median voters have the same income, which means that they share
the cost equally. In this case, the government always increases the size
of the public sector when the total income increases, unless the elasticity
of the net gains is perfectly inelastic or negative.
Now, we can establish the sign of i.
Lemma 3 In the Nash bargaining equilibrium with homogeneous pref-
erences, the marginal utility, marginal gains and elasticity of the gains
from having an e¢ cient government size are negatives for the richer
median voter and positives for the poorer.
Proof. The lemma is a consequence of the homogeneity of preferences
in equations 3 and 4. From equation 4, we know that in equilibrium the
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elasticities of the benet of the two median voters have di¤erent sign.
Given the structure of the elasticity, equation 4 is satised if and only
if median votersmarginal utilities have di¤erent sign. Now, associating
this result with equation 3 and assuming homogeneous preferences, the
rich median voter must be the one with negative marginal utility and
the poorer median voter, who benets from positive indirect transfers,
must have a positive marginal utility. This proves the lemma.
The intuition of the lemma is that everybody receives the same benet
from the public sector, but the richer pay more for it. This implies that
the richs marginal utility is negative in equilibrium.
The lemma also proves that if the redistribution of the cost does not
matter for the benevolent central planner it does matter in a bargaining
context. Clearly, only if the income disparity was zero, both median
voters would be equally satised and their marginal utility, gains and
elasticity would be zero.
The size of the right hand side of condition 6 is directly proportional to
the net redistribution and the term '. In particular, it is interesting to
analyze the e¤ect of income inequality on the size of the public sector
represented by the di¤erence i   j. In order to do that, we will sep-
arately examine the cases in which the government increases the size of
the public sector with respect to that of the status quo and the case in
which the new e¢ cient size is lower.
In the case where g > g, the government needs more resources to nance
the larger public sector. A consequence is an increase in income tax
redistribution. As the following proposition states, the e¤ect of changes
on the income of the richer is di¤erent from the e¤ect of changes on the
income of the poorer.
Proposition 4 With homogeneous preferences, the government size in-
creases when either the income of the poor median voter increases or
that of the rich decreases. Conversely, the size of the public sector de-
creases when either the income of the poor decreases or that of the rich
increases.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition we need to focus on condition
6 and study separately the following two cases: the rst in which i is the
poorest median voter and the second in which i is the richest.
First case: i is the poorest median voter. We have already shown that
the elasticity of the gains i of the poorest median voter is always positive
with homogeneous preferences. At the same time,
 
i   j

(g   g)'
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is always negative because i < j, g
 > g and ' > 0. As a result,
dg=dyi > 0 when i is the poorest median voter.
Second case: i is the richest median voter. We have already shown
that the elasticity of the gains i of the richest median voter is always neg-
ative with homogeneous preferences. At the same time,
 
i   j

(g   g)'
is always positive because i > j and g
 > g, and ' > 0. As a result,
dg=dyi < 0 when i is the richest median voter.
In the bargaining process, the wish to increase public consumption when
income increases contrasts with the increase of the marginal cost. The
poor have the lowest marginal cost and both a positive marginal utility
and gain from increasing public consumption. Certainly, the legisla-
ture will agree to increase the governments size when the poor become
wealthier. Similarly, the legislature will agree to decrease the govern-
ments size when the poor become poorer because the poor cannot a¤ord
a higher public consumption and the rich do not want to bear a higher
marginal cost.
The case in which the rich become poorer is interesting because the
governments size increases with homogeneous preferences. The reason
is that in such a situation the rich would agree on a larger public sector
simply because the marginal cost is now lower. As a consequence, the
poor have to bear a higher marginal cost, but their net marginal gain is
still positive and they will agree to a larger g, as well.
Similarly, when the richest become even richer and the income of the
poor remain the same, the rich will force the legislature to implement a
lower g under the threat that, in absence of an agreement, everybody
gets g < g.
The above proposition leads to the following main conclusions.
Conclusion 1 The poor median voter needs to reduce his or her eco-
nomic disadvantage to obtain a higher public consumption.
The behaviour of the rich leads to a paradoxical conclusion:
Conclusion 2 There may be cases in which the government size is
larger when the economy becomes poorer, and smaller when the econ-
omy becomes wealthier.
Similarly:
Conclusion 3 The size of the public sector may be relatively larger in
a poorer but more equally distributed economy, and relatively smaller in
a richer but more unequal economy.
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The impact of economic inequality upon government decision making
is now clear:
Conclusion 4 A larger income disparity leads to a smaller public sec-
tor.
The above results are based on the assumption that g > g. The case
in which g < g is a distinctive case. The inuence of an increase in the
income of one median voter goes against the current policy of decreas-
ing government size. The reduction of public consumption mitigates the
redistributive conicts and might drive to di¤erent results. In this situ-
ation, the rich median voter could agree to a larger size if her increased
relative cost is su¢ ciently compensated by the reduction of transfers.
Conversely, the poor could not allow for a larger size because of his loss
of transfers. In this case, the sign of the comparative static cannot be
determined a priori and depends on the median voterslosses and gains
from having a smaller public sector with less redistribution.
4.2 The case of heterogeneous preferences
The analysis can be generalized by considering the case of heterogeneous
preferences and income disparity. Condition 5 can by rewritten under
the following form:
dg
dyi
> 0 when i>
 
j   i

'
which tells us that the sign on the right-hand side depends on the dif-
ference between the median votersnet gains.
Clearly, the size of the public sector always increases when the median
voter i, whose income increases, has both a positive marginal gain and
the larger gains from the public sector. On the other hand, government
size moves to the opposite direction when the median voter i has both
a negative marginal gain and a su¢ ciently low net gains. In the other
intermediate cases, the sign of the comparative static depends on the
relative strength of both the marginal gains and the gains di¤erence.
4.3 Relative income and government size
The study of the variation in the public sector size due to changes in
the median voters relative income gives the same result as was reached
above. This is because an increase in a median voters income leads to
an increase in both his relative income and his relative cost. In formulas:
dg
di
> 0 when i >
 
j   i

'; with i = 1; 2.
However, this comparative static di¤ers from the previous because
the relative income may vary for several reasons.
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It is interesting to review the case in which the income of the median
voter i remains constant, but his relative income increases because the
income of the median voter j decreases. In this case, the analysis of the
preceding paragraph still holds. The consequence is that the government
can decide to increase the provision of public goods even if the income of
one region is lower and the income of the other remains the same. This
circumstance conrms our paradoxical conclusion that the government
may increase provision when the total income becomes lower because of
a reduction in the redistributive conicts between regions.
To summarize, interregional redistributive conicts are more dramatic
when the income gap between regions is greater. An expansion of the in-
come gap facilitates an under-provision of public goods. The government
reacts to changes in the relative income by increasing the provision of the
public sector only if the gains from public consumption are su¢ ciently
elastic. Furthermore, due to a reduction in the interregional income dis-
parity, a reduction of interregional redistributive conicts may cause an
increase of public goods provision even when the total income decreases.
5 Preference shocks
It is interesting to see the government reaction to a variation in a median
voters preference. An increase in the preference parameter  means
that the median voter receives a higher benet from the public sector.
However, the comparative statics shows that the government behaviour
is ambiguous: an increase in the benet does not necessarily imply an
increase in governments provision. Technically, dg=di > 0 if and only
if i <
gH0(g)
H(g) H(g)
10. The reason is that any increase in g has always a
negative impact upon median voters cost. As a result, governments
provision does not increase if the advantages are not su¢ ciently large
to exceed the cost. The case in which an increase in a median voters 
leads to a reduction of g might appear less intuitive. In some cases, it is
more convenient to decrease g, instead of increasing it because median
voters may have at list the same utility as before due to a reduction of
the cost. Consequently, when there is a positive shock in the preferences
government has to valuate if it is either more convenient to increase
benets by increasing g or reducing costs by lowering g.
10The proof is straightforward.
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6 Comparing the negotiated solution with the dic-
tators outcome
We can use the Nash bargaining First Order Condition in the form of
equation 4 in order to compare the negotiated solution with that of the
non-benevolent dictator. We already know that the marginal gain from
cooperating of the median voter i = 1; 2 is equal to is marginal utility;
i.e.: 0i =
@(ui udi )
@g
=  ip + iH 0 (g) = @ui@g = Mui. As a consequence,
the negotiated outcome lies between the two median votersrst best,
unless they coincide. This result can be used to compare the bargaining
with the non-benevolent dictators outcome.
Recall that the median voters rst best can be interpreted as the pro-
vision of the public good that the non-benevolent dictator would choose.
Indicating with gDi , g
D
j and g
 the provision of the public good chosen
respectively by the non-benevolent dictators and the negotiated provi-
sion, the three solutions are compared in gure 2. The axis measures
the utility of the two median voters.
At the disagreement point, the median voters consume the private
good plus an ine¢ cient level of public goods. When the public sector
is more e¢ ciently provided, the total utility of the median voters starts
to increase. They obtain the maximum level of private utility at their
individual rst best. If the government provides more public good than
one median voter wants, his total utility decreases with respect to the
individual rst best utility. This is because the utility he gains from
consuming more of the public good is lower than the utility he loses from
consuming less of the private good. The agreement is a compromise; it
lies between the two private rst best solutions gDi and g
D
j . The Nash
bargaining solution represents an agreement in which one of the median
voters would like to consume more of the public good and the other one
would like to consume less of it.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyses the relation between income disparity and the size
of the public sector or, in general, the provision of public goods. We have
presented a bargaining decision-making model between regional repre-
sentatives alternative to the utilitarian approach. A quality of the model
is that it captures the interregional redistributive conicts generated by
income inequality.
Both the nancing of the public sector with a proportional income tax
and the uniform provision across regions imply income tax redistribu-
tions, which cause inter-regional conicts and under-provision in govern-
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ment spending. The non-benevolent dictator free-rides over the others
taxpayers increasing the provision of public goods when both the in-
come and the relative cost of the median voter of the other jurisdiction
increase. On the contrary, the central planner does not care about how
the cost is shared among taxpayers.
Redistributive conicts emerge dramatically when we consider the nego-
tiated policy outcome. Both larger income disparity and heterogeneous
preferences lead to a smaller public sector. In this scenario, in order
to increase public consumption, the poor need to reduce their income
gap or the rich need to increase tax income redistribution in favour of
the poor. Furthermore, larger social gains favour a larger public sec-
tor. However, when the income of a regional median voter increases,
the government increases the size of the public sector only if the gains
of that median voter are su¢ ciently elastic. Unanimity agreement does
not allow for coercion in this model.
The case of homogeneous districts is particularly explicative. In this
case, ine¢ ciency in terms of under provision is directly proportional to
the inter-regional income inequality. It disappears when the di¤erence
between regional incomes converges to zero and becomes more relevant
the larger the income gap. As a result, the size of the public sector is
smaller either the higher the income of the rich or the lower the income
of the poor. Conversely, the size of the government is larger when either
the income of the poor increases or the income of the rich decreases.
Paradoxically, reductions of median votersincome may cause an increase
in the size of the public sector when income inequality between regions
is smaller. This is due to a weakening of inter-regional redistributive
conicts. Similarly, when the median voters become wealthier, but at
the same time the distribution of income is more unequal, the size of the
public sector may be reduced because of the worsening of redistributive
conicts.
The Nash bargaining outcome is Pareto e¢ cient from the individual
point of view. However, looking at the comparative statics, the bargain-
ing outcome appears as second best if compared with the social optimum.
The central planner has a higher degree of freedom in choosing the size of
the public sector and the associate redistribution. If we represent social
welfare as the sum of median votersutility, then the best response to
any increase of total income is to increase the size of the public sector.
Consequently, any size lower than the social optimum is a second best
because it doesnt maximize social welfare.
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The results of this paper support the theses of that part of the literature
which argues that countries with larger income inequality tends to be
less redistributive; see Bassett et al. (1999), Bènabou (2000), Bjorvatn
and Cappellen (2003a), Persson (1995) and others.
8 Future developments
This analysis can be expanded to incorporate political parties choosing
policy by bargaining in a political competition context. Partiesleaders
bargain over policy by taking into account a function representing the
social consensus. As it is already well established in literature, median
voter theory applies only to models regarding a one-dimensional policy
issue with single peaked preferences. The replacement of median voters
with political parties maximizing their probability to win an election,
would allow for the extension of the model to the study of multidimen-
sional cases. For example, it could be possible to study the relation
between the governments size and the structure of its tax system.
The model can also be extended to analyze some international issues, like
international or global bargaining over pollution control or the European
decision-making process. The debate concerning a European defence
policy, for example, can be formally analysed by introducing in the model
an outside option representing the utility each single European country
obtains if defence continues to be provided at the national level.
Finally, it could be interesting to build up a model in which the repre-
sentatives of more than two districts have to form a minimum winning
coalition to choose policy in the legislature.
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9 Appendix
For simplicity, we denote the First Order Condition with
G =
 i + iH 0 (g)
 i (g   g) + i (H (g) H (g))
+
 j + jH 0 (g)
 j (g   g) + j (H (g) H (g))
= 0
Proof. Here, we prove condition 5. In order to do that we need to
study the sign of dg

dyi other variables constant
  Gyi
Gg
; where:
Gg =
iH
00 (g) [ i (g   g) + i (H (g) H (g))]  [ i + iH 0 (g)]2
[ i (g   g) + i (H (g) H (g))]2
+
+
jH
00 (g)
 j (g   g) + j (H (g) H (g))   j + jH 0 (g)2 j (g   g) + j (H (g) H (g))2
is always negative.
Now, we study the sign of Gyi; where
Gyi =
  yj
yi+yj
p [ i (g   g) + i (H (g) H (g))] + yjyi+yj pg [ i + iH 0 (g)]
[ i (g   g) + i (H (g) H (g))]2
+
+
yj
yi+yj
p
 j (g   g) + j (H (g) H (g))  yjyi+yj pg  j + jH 0 (g) j (g   g) + j (H (g) H (g))2
Gyi is positive when
i >
j   i
j + i
that gives condition 5.
Note that  1 < j i
j+i
< 1.
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Figure 1: The e¢ cient outcome.
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Figure 2: Comparing the negotiated outcome with that of the non-
benevolent dictator.
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